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Abstract 
There is a phenomenon which exists in complex engineered systems, most notably those which 
are electrical or electronic which is the inability to diagnose faults reported during operation.  This 
includes difficulties in detecting the same reported symptoms with standard testing, the inability to 
correctly localise the suspected fault and the failure to diagnose the problem which has resulted in 
maintenance work.  However an inconsistent terminology is used in connection with this 
phenomenon within both scientific communities and industry.  It has become evident that 
ambiguity, misuse and misunderstanding have directly compounded the issue.  The purpose of 
this paper is to work towards standardisation of the taxonomy surrounding the phenomena 
popularly termed No Fault Found, Retest Okay, Cannot Duplicate or Fault Not Found amongst 
many others. This includes discussion on how consistent terminology is essential to the experts 
within organisation committees and, to the larger group of users, who do not have specialised 
knowledge of the field. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the advent of electronic systems, engineers 
have seen increasing the reliability and maintenance 
effectiveness of the technology in use as a 
paramount objective in through-life engineering 
capability (Phillips et al, 2011, Simpson and 
Sheppard, 1992).  Traditionally, approaches to 
reliability have been focused on 
system/subsystem/component levels as a purely 
technical issue, which are dealt with once the 
product specifications are outside of the pre-defined 
parameters (Qi et al 2008).  However, increasing 
system complexities have now appreciated separate 
types of reliability issues, which are not dependent 
on technical specifications or performance, but are 
related to business process and human factors (Wu, 
2011, Vichare et al, 2007) 
 
Understanding system reliability from technical and 
non-technical perspectives has become the focal 
point in research when considering faults which 
cannot be correctly diagnosed or even detected 
under standard maintenance testing.  This is 
commonly termed No Fault Found (NFF) amongst a 
multitude of other similar terms with Fault Not Found 
(FNF) Retest Okay (RTOK) or Cannot Duplicate 
(CND) to name a few of the more common. This 
difference in terminology is found to differ across 
industries, organisations and even individual 
maintenance lines, which often undermines the 
many reasons ranging from simple faults in 
electronics, to the way in which the organisational 
structure is setup.  There is also a feeling beginning 
to be expressed that the actual term which is used, 
and the increased inconsistency, is undermining 
attempts to help solve these problems. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide the basis to 
move towards formal research discussion and 
investigation into the need for standardisation to 
help reduce the occurrence and impact of 
NFF/RTOK/CND/FNF, in particular the promotion of 
a common taxonomy within the subject area. 
 
2 THE PROBLEM 
 
In order to address the scale of the problem we 
need to become familiar with a sequence of events 
which result in what we will describe in this paper as 
a ‘diagnostic failure’ (often reported as No Fault 
Found or a similar descriptive term).  This sequence 
begins during operational service when a Built-In-
Test (BIT) fails or the operator reports the possibility 
of an error.  Independent functionality tests will then 
be ordered on the suspect Line replaceable Unit 
(LRU) at 1
st
 line maintenance to look to verify the 
fault/failure, if it cannot be repeated a failure to 
diagnose the problem will be recorded.  If the 
functionality tests fail, then further off-line tests 
within the maintenance shop/depth will be used to 
diagnose the system fault to a group of Shop 
Replaceable Units (SRUs) that are suspected of 
being the source of the LRU failure.  Depending 
upon the accuracy of the diagnosis at this level, 
ideally only one SRU will be called out; less precise 
diagnostics may call out two, three or more SRUs.  
The called out SRU(s) are then sent back to the 
depot for functional testing using Automatic Test 
Equipment (ATE).  If the SRU passes at this stage a 
diagnostic failure will be recorded. There are then 
two possible scenarios, either the SRU may be 
healthy and falsely replaced, or it is probably faulty 
and the diagnostic testing is inadequate (Ungar, 
2007).   
 
Such scenarios will evidently have a negative impact 
on system requirements, which at the top level may 
include safety, dependability, availability as well as 
negative implications for Whole Life Cycle (WLC) 
costs. All major industries which operate complex 
engineered systems (in particular those which are 
electrical or electronic) suffer from such failures 
within the diagnostic process as described. These 
industries, which a small selection, include 
military/civil aerospace, automotive, energy and 
consumer electronics. 
 
3 OCCURRENCE OF DIAGNOSTIC FAILURE 
 
It is clear that a great many of the diagnostic failure 
events which are of interest occur in avionics, 
electrical and electro-mechanical, but initial research 
shows that mechanical systems also  give rise to 
similar difficulties but are far less known. Figure 1 
captures and presents a non-exhaustive list of 
instances found in literature that classify 
events/factors as NFF (or with a similar terminology 
variant).  
 
In Electronics systems, loose connections probably 
cover most of the faults that have been published as 
NFF (Jones and Hayes, 2001, Line and Krishnan, 
2007). Some of the more common and well known 
include poor solder joints, faulty electrical 
components, damaged PCBs and problems with 
internal wiring. In addition, electronic failures are not 
considered as static (or random) events, but a 
process of mechanical and material changes.  
These changes will not always lead to a loss of 
operation for the system, even though their 
components are out of specification.  This is 
because electronics have an inherent self-
compensating aspect which makes the task of 
diagnostics difficult.  In addition to this self-
compensation, degradation of failure modes will 
manifest differently depending upon the operating 
environment and may offset one another depending 
on circuit configuration (Line and Krishnan 2007). 
There are several generic causes of faults and 
failures within electronic systems (Pecht et al, 
2001): 
 Interconnect failures (including connectors) 
 System design (electrical and mechanical) 
 Excessive environment (temperature, 
moisture, chemicals, mechanical stresses) 
 User handling 
 
The failure mechanisms within a mechanical system 
are widely regarded as having less of an effect upon 
the rate of NFF occurrences than those which are 
present within electrical systems.  The causes of 
failure in mechanical systems are similar to those in 
electrical systems, such as ageing, poor 
maintenance, incorrect installation or usage.  The 
difference however is that it is much easier to 
predict the effect upon the systems operation with 
mechanical failures.  As a result this allows 
inspection criteria to be developed during the design 
 phases.  It should be noted that as with many 
electrical failures, mechanical failures can be 
intermittent in nature and only occurring under 
specific operating conditions.  Some of the more 
common mechanical failures which are of interest 
but receive a lot less attention then the electrical 
failures which contribute to diagnostic failure are: 
 
 Broken seals and leaks: Leaks from broken 
seals will affect the operation of items which 
include engines, gearboxes, control 
actuators and hydraulic systems.  The 
nature of seal design is that they are often 
designed to slightly ‘weep’.  This is a good 
example of the need for maintenance 
personnel to be familiar with the system and 
hence be aware of what constitutes 
acceptable leakage in order to avoid 
unnecessary removals.   
 
 Degradation of pneumatic and hydraulic 
pipes:  Degradation within pipes often 
occurs due to corrosion or fretting against 
other components or structures.  The nature 
of pneumatic/hydraulic systems is that 
under pressure they may develop small 
leaks.  These minor leaks may result in an 
alarm to the operator indicating failure, 
resulting in the unwarranted shut down of 
the system, when no equipment malfunction 
has actually occurred.   
 
 Backlash in mechanical systems: One area 
where backlash can cause significant 
concern is within actuation systems, 
particularly those used for aircraft control 
surfaces.  It is possible that with excessive 
wear in actuator couplings, position sensors 
may indicate incorrect operation, including 
asymmetric settings, which are difficult to 
isolate from a maintenance perspective. 
 
It is clear that a great deal of NFF occur in avionics, 
electrical and electro-mechanical systems, however 
research discussions have also revealed that 
software is also a key contributor to the problem. 
This includes processing delays, discrepancies 
between software testing procedures, timing errors, 
lack of appropriate training, or perhaps a poorly 
written program code (Mariani et al, 2011). 
 
4 A MULTITUDE OF TERMS 
 
What rapidly becomes evident when reviewing the 
associated literature, coupled with discussions with 
industrial organisations, is that there are no 
standards in place to ensure correct identification, 
reporting and mitigation of these problems.  To date 
no published academic literature has been found by 
the authors of this paper which specifically 
raises/deals the issue how the disparity between 
terminology and definitions affects the ability to deal 
with the issue of diagnostic failures.  This is despite 
the earliest real call for this standardisation has 
been found in Simpson et al. (1987) where research 
into testability attributes of electronic equipment, 
specifically to mitigate NFF – but this has not yet 
been achieved across all test/maintenance levels.  
Early research in the EPSRC Centre for Innovative 
Manufacturing in Through-life Engineering Services 
shows that one of the major drivers and influences 
on the cultural impacts contributing to the inability to 
diagnose a reported fault is this lack of 
standardisation, clarity and inappropriate usage of 
taxonomies. Figure 2 shows the results of a recent 
survey conducted by Copernicus Technology Ltd 
into the causes and perceptions of NFF in the 
aerospace industry responded to by approximately 
120 aerospace organisations.  The results show that 
approximately half of the respondents refer to it as 
No Fault Found but the other half refers to it as a 
variety of other terms.  
 
There was of course a degree of variation observed 
within this survey depending on sector for example 
in the airworthiness/QCI/regulatory sector the use of 
No Fault Found reduced to 38% whilst ‘Cannot 
Duplicate’ and ‘Unable to reproduce Fault’ both 
increased to 21%.  The highest percentage of 
respondents referring to ‘No Fault Found’ was in the 
production/design/R&D sector (52%) and in the 
maintenance sector (62%).   
 
Despite such variations, fundamentally all these 
terms are frequently assumed to be being applied to 
identical events where the attempts to answer the 
question of why the unit has ended up in the 
maintenance process has failed.  The diversity in 
the terms used to describe this event highlights that 
manufacturers, suppliers and operators are more 
than aware that there is a problem and 
acknowledge the existence of the phenomena 
throughout the whole-life cycle of the product.  
 
There are two possible areas of investigation which 
result from this disparity: 
  
Figure 2: Results showing a disparity in terminology 
from a recent survey into NFF within aerospace 
(Huby, 2012) 
1) How can a true gauge of the problem be 
investigated if there is no standardised term 
used in the maintenance history? 
 
2) Are all of these terms accurate – do they 
actually describe the same event, or are 
there subtle differences which need to be 
recognised? 
 
5 THE CONSEQUENCE OF INCONSISTENT 
TERMINOLOGY 
 
Considering the first question, research by Roke 
(2009), which used the Harrier aircraft as a research 
platform perfectly, illustrated this problem. In this 
research, in order to gauge the size of the problem 
based upon ‘work hours’, both forward and depth 
domain maintenance data was independently filtered 
for events tagged as the LITS (Logistics Information 
Technology Strategy) default phrase ‘01 – No fault 
found after check/test’.  The result returned an 
average occurrence of ~3.5% over approximately a 
3 year period.  This is significantly different to what 
the research had found in the literature which 
indicated an average 42% across multiple 
industries.  What was however found was that 
despite LITS application users being able to 
populate a ‘Work Carried Out (WCO)’ field with a 
default phrase the reporting was laden with a 
multitude of additional maintenance actions. 
 
In the forward domain some 13 different NFF 
phrases were extracted as being available for use by 
the LITS. There was also strong evidence that many 
of these events were misreported or false feedback 
terms such as ‘fault cleared itself during 
investigation’ were used to circumvent formalities. 
Expanding the database query produced an average 
figure of 10.5% occurrences.  A significant increase 
on the original figure which was generated on the 
presumption that reporting was accurate and 
consistent A similar picture was seen within the 
depth domain where the figure leapt to ~27%. Two 
of the key findings of this research relating to 
disparity between terminologies were as follows: 
 
1) The problem is being under reported by 
approximately 300%. 
 
2) The disparity between original and tagged 
facts is caused by the significant miscoding 
of events bought on by the availability of 
LITS terms. 
 
3) The output of LITS data within the forward 
domain is very erroneous and cannot be 
relied upon to provide an accurate picture of 
aircraft/fleet health. 
 
It is expected that there will be a high likelihood that 
a very similar situation will occur in other industries 
such as civil aviation and within rail 
vehicles/infrastructure where best practice and/or 
past experiences may be able to be shared if an 
appropriate knowledge transfer platform was 
developed.  But for now the more generalised 
recommendations would be to work towards: 
 
1) Ensuring reporting is based upon a set of 
accepted and standardised phrases and 
terms in order to avoid false/misreporting 
and all applicable events are captured. 
 
2) The functionality of recording systems 
should be simplified restricting erroneous 
use of terms. 
 
6 STANDARDISING THE TAXONOMY 
6.1 Why do we need standards? 
 
Adopting standards help industries (and research) 
overcome technical barriers by promoting 
organisational success through better workflow 
paradigms and maintenance strategies. Since 
diagnosis failure is a multidisciplinary issue, 
establishing a formal methodology, process, criteria 
and practice may help reduce the consequences of 
such failures. However, one interesting point in the 
discussion is where exactly do these diagnostic 
failures occur within the maintenance process? 
Most of the definitions for these phenomena do not 
provide any consideration for this and therefore 
leads to the assumption that the level of test is 
unimportant. For example the following definitions 
can be extracted from the information provided in 
published research: 
 
“No Fault Found is a reported failure that cannot 
be confirmed, recognised or localised during 
diagnosis and therefore cannot be repaired” 
(Roke, 2009) 
 
“The inability to replicate field failure during 
repair shop test/diagnosis” (Kirkland, 2011) 
 
“A failure that may have occurred but cannot be 
verified, or replicated at will, or attributed to a 
specific root cause, failure site, or failure mode” 
(Qi et al, 2008).  
 
“Removals of equipment from service for 
reasons that cannot be verified by the 
maintenance process (shop or elsewhere)” 
(ARINC Report 672, 2008) 
 
6.2 Is a single term enough? 
 
It should be noted that these are only a few 
abbreviated examples of a huge number of 
definitions (or descriptions) which continue to grow.  
The lack of a single common descriptive and 
standard term indicates that, even among 
 researchers, practitioners and other experts, the 
phenomena is not well understood.  
 
The majority of definitions lead to this ingrained 
belief that a failure during operation (such as an 
intermittent fault) is the actual ‘No Fault Found’ 
event, and hence leads to the majority of academic 
literature to classify NFF into three distinct 
categories: intermittent failures, integration faults 
and Built In Test Equipment (BITE) failures. On the 
contrary, the authors of this paper argue that such a 
practice is incorrect as these are primarily the root 
causes which begin a sequence of events through 
various levels of maintenance, which blend with 
other factors such as 
organisational/behavioural/cultural and technical 
abilities to result in the final outcome of NFF.  These 
factors should be defined as separate to the root 
causes and should be considered as the ‘drivers 
towards diagnostic failure’.  Below is a small 
sample outlining this distinction between root causes 
(the faults which lead to an alarm and hence 
maintenance action) the root cause source (the 
location of the fault within the equipment), drivers 
(the influencing factors leading to diagnostic failure): 
 
Root causes (faults) 
 Intermittency 
 BIT/BITE 
 Integration and software faults 
 Operator error 
 Poor design 
 Design defects 
 False alarm 
 
Root cause sources 
 Connectors 
 Cables 
 Chasis (LRU) 
 Components 
 
Drivers towards diagnostic failure 
 Lack of communication 
 Inadequate test coverage or performance 
measures 
 Lack of information on the operating 
environment 
 Incorrect fault reporting 
 Discrepancies in test procedures 
 Wrong process or test equipment 
 Inadequate/missing process 
 
It is believed then that a true definition and 
standardised terminology should be developed to 
reflect that we are not talking about simply a generic 
fault that cannot be reproduced – but is the result of 
a sequence of interlinking events, at different levels 
beginning with the root cause fault, but ultimately 
being driven to a diagnostic failure through a 
multitude of integrated issues. 
 
In fact, there is some evidence within the literature 
that this is being recognised. There is a level of 
ambiguity in the literature where often at 1
st
 line the 
event is labelled Cannot Duplicate (CND) and within 
the depth maintenance the event is often labelled as 
Re-test Okay (RTOK). The distinction between 
Cannot Duplicate (CND) and RTOK is that CND 
occurs at the same level of maintenance where the 
fault was reported and RTOK occurs at subsequent 
levels of maintenance (Ungar and Kirkland, 2008). 
This difference in terminology is found to differ 
across industries, organisations and even individual 
maintenance lines.  
 
This idea is captured in the definition and 
explanation as provided by Soderholm (2007).  This 
is illustrated in Figure 3 which recognises that the 
level of test is important. 
 
“At any test level, a fault may be recognized and 
localized to a unit. However, when the unit is 
tested at a subsequent test level, the 
recognition or localization of the fault may be 
unsuccessful”. 
 
“This situation can occur for a number of 
reasons. One possibility is that having correctly 
recognized, and appropriately localized the fault 
at the preceding level, attempts to replicate the 
test results at the subsequent level are 
unsuccessful. Another possibility is the fault 
being incorrectly recognized or localized at the 
preceding level”. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The phenomena described as NFF 
(Soderholm 2007) 
 
This explanation recognises that the level of test is 
an important focal point.  In relation to this point 
Ungar (2007) provides the following definitions taken 
from a set of defined terminology as part of model 
guidelines for ‘Design for Testability (DfT)’. 
 
Cannot Duplicate (CND): a faulty unit, whose faulty 
behaviour cannot be repeated consistently within the 
same level for repair 
  
Retest OK (RTOK): the passing of the Replaceable 
Unit (RU) test, which at the previous level was 
determined to be faulty.  A RTOK could sometimes 
be referred to as No Fault Found. 
 
The key point to note here is that the distinguishing 
characteristic between an RTOK and a CND is that 
RTOKs can only be determined after a subsequent 
level of repair, CNDs happen within the same level 
of repair. Taking the definition provided by 
Soderholm (2007) RTOK would be the same as 
NFF, but CND would be a separate and distinct from 
NFF. This would however indicate that at either the 
2
nd
, 3
rd
 to the n
th
 level of repair the term RTOK or 
NFF or something entirely different will be recorded 
– but where then is the distinction? Is it even 
necessary to provide a coherent terminology through 
the maintenance levels – or does one term do the 
job for 2
nd
, 3
rd
 or the n
th
 line?   
 
Ungar (2007) illustrating that a RTOK situation is a 
2
nd
 order problem inherited from a previous 
maintenance level (L-1) the term should be labelled 
RTOKL-1.  However, as illustrated that CND and 
RTOK refer to two different events it may be that at 
even deeper maintenance lines there requires a 
distinction in terminology to capture the fact that at 
each testing level the drivers (reasons) for the 
diagnostic failure resulting in RTOK/NFF may be 
different.  For example, maybe at 2
nd
 level the 
drivers which resulted in the RTOK occurred 
because there was an inadequate outdated 
troubleshooting guide but then at 3
rd
 level these 
drivers were different and it was the test equipment 
lacked the necessary test sensitivity.   
 
 
 
Figure 4: The repair process 
Understanding what is actually meant by terms such 
as those in Figure 2 in the same way as the 
coherent descriptions for RTOK and CND will 
provide insights into whether a single common term 
should be championed as a default – or whether 
multiple terms should be used depending on the 
circumstances of occurrence (such as the 
maintenance level, or even based on the suspected 
driver as illustrated in Figure 4).   
 
 
7 HAS THE TERM ‘NO FAULT FOUND’ 
ENGRAINED A CULTURE OF ACCEPTANCE?  
 
There is in order to start a cultural change there is a 
definite need for standardisation and in some cases 
an overhaul of the terminology used for NFF.  
Senior UK industrial engineers representing the UK 
aerospace industry have expressed their belief that 
the term NFF (which is the most frequent term in 
use) quite possible provides a hindrance to reducing 
those cases labelled as NFF. If the result of a test is 
described as No Fault Found what does this really 
mean and how is it perceived in the mind-set of the 
test engineer? Firstly, we should consider the two 
main outcomes of a resulting NFF: 
 
1) There has been no evidence of faults during 
testing so the unit can be certified as 
serviceable as there probably never was a 
fault. 
 
2) There has been no evidence of faults during 
testing but the test coverage may be 
inadequate so it is best to replace the unit 
just to be on the safe side. 
 
This is the current practice, one way or another 
there will be a repeat NFF event – either because a 
faulty unit re-enters service or the wrong unit has 
been replaced.  It needs to be acknowledged that 
the NFF phenomenon is not a single event – it is a 
sequence of events which begin with a warning or 
alarm (detected fault) on board the main equipment. 
Resulting in a series of actions at various 
maintenance levels until finally a decision is made to 
add the NFF label and perform one of the two 
actions above.  These two actions however are 
missing the key point in solving the problem – 
something has occurred to result in that final 
decision - this is the root cause – the initial fault, 
whether that is intermittency, a false alarm, over 
sensitive BIT thresholds or systems integration 
problems, has not been identified. This fits with a 
popular definition of the NFF phenomena (Cockram 
and Huby, 2009): 
 
“A reported fault for which the root cause 
cannot be found – in other words a diagnostic 
failure” 
 
 So to eradicate NFF (or reduce it consequences) it 
is essential to identify how that root causes blend 
with the various drivers earlier identified and 
encourage engineers/technicians to look more 
closely at why they have failed to diagnose the 
problem.  So with this in mind, senior industrial 
engineers representing the UK aerospace industry 
to approach the NFF research team in the EPSRC 
Centre for Innovative Manufacturing in Through-life 
Engineering Services to assess potential cultural 
impacts of describing the issue as a Fault Not 
Found (FNF) which offers a statement telling you 
the problem has not been fixed! Rather than NFF 
which suggests an attitude of resignation and that 
there was probably no fault there anyway. FNF 
suggests that we must still do something to solve a 
problem and there is an acceptance that something 
must be done.  Adoption of more positive 
descriptors may help in culturally shifting the 
workforce to change from the general reactive 
mentality to a much more proactive approach in 
dealing with NFF.   
 
However, in order to be objective we also need to 
recognise that not all industry sectors agree with this 
aerospace stance. A leading international 
construction vehicle manufacturer disagrees with the 
need for this and has claimed that changing and 
adopting a universal name will not change anything.  
The problem is still the same:  
 
“We used the term ‘Trouble Not Identified’ for a 
while years ago.  We got that term from 
automotive.  It just confused people.  The 
culture of acceptance is driven from a lack of 
understanding of the real drivers of NFF” 
 
What is interesting about this statement is the idea 
that there is a lack of understanding on “…..the real 
drivers of NFF”.  This supports what is being seen 
in the literature with over simplified descriptive 
terms, attempts to classify the root cause as NFF 
rather than recognising it as an element in a chain of 
events which are influenced by organisational 
behaviour and culture as well as processes and 
procedures.  These are the drivers which need to be 
understood and it is believed by the author that 
standardising taxonomy, unifying definitions, 
championing the correct terminology and creating a 
high level of coherency are essential to push forward 
the understanding of these driving factors. 
 
8 CONCLUSION  
 
The phenomenon which is the subject of this paper 
has been, and is in industry, commonly classified as 
a ‘diagnostic failure’.  This however indicates a 
closed-loop system with identifiable symptom → 
failure → decision relations; identifying and road 
mapping this relationship will be a key challenge in 
improving diagnostic success.  This will require a 
complete fundamental understanding of the 
phenomena including clear distinctions between root 
cause faults, root cause sources and the influencing 
factors (drivers) covering the entire maintenance 
process. 
 
What has become clear is that the lack of standards 
in this area results in different terms being used to 
describe the same events in the maintenance 
records. This obfuscates the scale of the problem – 
a common term would provide meaningful statistics 
on the problem allowing it to be easily identified.   
 
There is also a clash of opinions between different 
industries over just how necessary the adoption of a 
standard terminology/taxonomy is.  It appears to be 
favoured within the aerospace sector where they 
have evidently recognised that human factors are a 
core driver towards diagnostic failure. Current 
research within the EPSRC Centre for Through-life 
Engineering Services will certainly be keeping an 
open mind on this as it is recognised that different 
industries have different needs and differing 
practices. Even though there is almost certainly 
good practice in mitigating these events which is not 
being shared, one universal solution is unlikely, and 
what has not worked in one industry may be just 
what another industry needs. 
 
9 ACRONYMS USED FOR NFF VARIANTS 
 
Below is a non-exhaustive list of acronyms often 
associated with the No-Fault Found phenomenon: 
 
NFF – No-Fault Found 
TNI – Trouble Not Identified 
NTF – No Trouble Found 
NPF – No Problem Found 
FNF – Fault Not Found 
NAD – No Apparent Defect (or Damage) 
NEOF – No Evidence of Failure 
NFA – No Fault Apparent 
CNRF – Can Not Reproduce Fault 
CND – Can Not Duplicate 
NDF – No Defect Found 
FCDI – Fault Cleared During Investigation 
NFI – No Fault Indicated 
RTOK – Re-Test OK 
CNF – Cause Not Found 
NFI – No Fault Indications 
NPR – No Problems Reported 
UTRF – Unable To Reproduce (or Replicate) Fault 
RA – Repeat Arising 
 
10 REFERENCES 
 
ARINC Report 672, 2008, Guidelines for the 
reduction of No Fault Found (NFF), Avionics 
Maintenance Conference, Aeronautical Radio 
Inc. 
 
Cockram, J., Huby, G., 2009, No Fault Found (NFF) 
occurrences and intermittent faults: improving 
availability of aerospace platforms/systems by 
refining maintenance practices, systems of 
work and testing regimes to effectively identify 
their root causes, CEAS European Air and 
Space Conference, Manchester, 26-29 October 
2009. 
 
Huby, G., (2012), “NO Fault Found: Aerospace 
Survey Results”, Copernicus Technology Ltd 
 
Jones, J., Hayes, J., 2001, Investigations of the 
occurrence of: No-faults-found in electronic 
systems, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol 
50. No 3, pp. 289 – 292 
 
Kirkland, L.V., 2011, "Why did we add LabVIEW 
applications to our ATLAS TPSs?," 
AUTOTESTCON, IEEE, pp.266-271, 12-15 
September 2011 
 
Mariani, L., Pastore, F., Pezzè, F. (2011), “Dynamic 
analysis for diagnosing integration faults”, IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol. 37, 
No 4. pp. 486 – 508 
 
Pecht, M., Dube, M., Natishan, M., Williams, R., 
Banner, J., Knowles, I. (2001), “Evaluation of 
built-in-tests”, IEEE Transactions on Aerospace 
and Electronic Systems, Vol 37, No 1, pp. 266 – 
271 
 
Line, J., Krishnan, G. (2007), “Managing and 
predicting intermittent failures within long life 
electronics”, IEEE, pp. 1 – 6 
 
Phillips, P., Diston, D., Starr, A. (2011), 
“Perspectives on the commercial development 
of landing gear health monitoring systems”, 
Transportation Research Part C: Emerging 
Technologies, Vol 19, No 6, pp. 1339-1352 
 
Qi, H., Geneson, S., Pecht, M. (2008), “No-fault-
found and intermittent failures in electronic 
products”, Microelectronics Reliability, vol 48, 
pp. 663 – 674 
 
Roke, S. (2009), “Harrier No Fault Found reduction”, 
MSc Dissertation in Engineering Business 
Management, Faculty of Engineering and 
Computing Coventry university 
 
Simpson, W., Gilreath, E., Kelley, B. (1987), 
“Predictors of organizational-level testability 
attributes”, ARINC Research Corporation, 
(Final Technical Report RADC-TR-87-85) 
 
Simpson, W., Sheppard, J., (1992), “Analyses of 
false alarms during system design”, IEEE, pp. 
657 – 660 
 
Soderholm, P. (2007),” A system view of the No 
Fault Found (NFF) phenomenon”, Reliability & 
System Safety, Vol 92, No 1, pp. 1-14 
 
Ungar, L., (2007), “Design for diagnosability 
guidelines”, IEEE Instrumentation & 
Measurement Magazine, pp 24 – 32 
 
Ungar, L., Kirkland, L., (2008), “Unravelling the 
cannot duplicate and retest OK problems by 
utilizing physics in testing and diagnoses”, 
IEEE AUTOTESTCON, Salt lake City, UT, USA 
8th – 11th September 
 
Vichare, N., Rodgers, P., Eveloy, V., Pecht, M. 
(2007), “Environmental and usage monitoring 
of electronic products for health assessment 
and product design”, Quality Technology and 
Quantitive Management”, Vol 4, No 2, pp. 235 
– 250 
 
Wu, S., 2011, Warranty claim analysis considering 
human factors, Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, Vol 96, pp. 131 – 138 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
